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Abstract
Is Quantitative Easing (QE) an effective substitute for conventional monetary pol-
icy? We study this question using a quantitative heterogeneous-agents model with
nominal rigidities, as well as liquid and partially liquid wealth. The direct effect of
QE on aggregate demand is determined by the difference in marginal propensities to
consume out of the two types of wealth, which is large according to the model and
empirical studies. A comparison of optimal QE and interest rate rules reveals that QE
is indeed a very powerful instrument to anchor expectations and to stabilize output
and inflation. However, QE interventions come with strong side effects on inequality,
which can substantially lower social welfare. A very simple QE rule, which we refer to
as Real Reserve Targeting, is approximately optimal from a welfare perspective when
conventional policy is unavailable. We further estimate the model on U.S. data and
find that QE interventions greatly mitigated the decline in output during the Great
Recession.
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1 Introduction
It has been over ten years since the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) initiated a colossal expan-
sion of its balance sheet; the largest since the Great Depression. The 2008 financial crisis
compelled the Fed to start providing loans to the banking sector, which was suffering from
a freeze of interbank lending. However, as banks recovered from the crisis the Fed did not
shrink its balance sheet but instead expanded it further, buying up assets such as long-term
government debt in large quantities. This was done in a bid to stimulate aggregate demand,
which slumped during the Great Recession. Known as Quantitative Easing (QE), these
interventions acted as a placeholder for conventional monetary policy, which had become
powerless as the policy rate had hit the zero lower bound. Similar interventions took place
in the UK and the Euro Area, as well as in Japan during the early 2000s.
While conducting QE, central banks received little guidance from economic theory, as
this type of policy is completely ineffective in modern textbook models such as the stan-
dard New Keynesian (NK) model, see for instance Woodford (2012). Nevertheless, central
bankers have carried on with QE, presumably believing that it is a useful instrument to
manage aggregate demand. However, a decade into the balance sheet expansion it is still
not well understood when to use QE, how aggressively to use it, and when to roll it back.
This leaves central banks in a precarious position in the face of upcoming recessions, when
the limits of conventional monetary policy might once again be reached.
This paper presents a quantitative NK model to provide policy makers with more guid-
ance on how to use QE as a stabilization instrument. To this end, we extend the model
to allow for household heterogeneity and assets with different degrees of liquidity, following
a recent literature, see for instance Kaplan et al. (2017). In this setting, QE interventions
can have powerful effects on aggregate demand, but they may also create strong side effects
which exacerbate inequality and reduce social welfare.
In the model, QE stimulates aggregate spending by transforming the liquidity compo-
sition of households’ asset portfolios, which consist of fully liquid deposits and partially
liquid wealth stored in mutual funds. When conducting QE, the central bank buys assets
from the mutual funds, which triggers the creation of additional deposits. These deposits
end up being held by households, who use them to cushion the consumption effects of un-
employment. Following a QE purchase, the households thus hold a larger fraction of their
wealth in the form of fully liquid deposits and a smaller fraction within partially liquid mu-
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Figure 1: Reserves and deposits in the United States.
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tual funds. This liquidity transformation enhances their ability to keep on spending during
unemployment, and reduces their demand for precautionary saving while being employed.
Both factors increase the aggregate demand for goods, which in the presence of nominal
rigidities stimulates real activity. Similarly, the unwinding of QE tones down aggregate
demand, depending on the speed of the exit strategy.
Before describing the model, we present a simple formula which captures the essence of
the QE transmission mechanism and which can be used for back-of-the-envelope calculations.
The key insight conveyed by this formula is that the direct effect of QE depends on the
difference between the Marginal Propensities to Consume (MPCs) out of deposits and less
liquid sources of wealth. Empirical estimates in the literature suggest that the gap between
these two MPCs is large. An increase in deposit creation triggered by QE may therefore
boost aggregate demand substantially.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of reserves at the Fed, the aggregate amount of checkable
deposits, and the amount of deposits/currency held by households. As large-scale asset
purchases by the Fed began, all three series increased sharply. This strongly suggests that
QE triggered the creation of additional deposits, which in large part ended up being held
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by households.1
After calibrating the model to the U.S. economy, we investigate the efficacy of QE as
a stabilization tool, relative to conventional interest rate policy. Following much of the
NK literature, we assume that monetary policy follows a policy rule.2 In our case, this
means that there is either a rule for interest rate policy or a rule for QE, each depending
on output and inflation. QE is implemented by the central bank via purchases of long-term
government debt, financed by the issuance of reserves.3
We evaluate the relative efficacy of QE along several dimensions. First, we consider the
ability of QE to anchor expectations, i.e. to rule out fluctuations driven purely by changes in
beliefs about the future. As is well known in the literature, conventional policy does so only
when the interest rate rule satisfies the “Taylor principle”, meaning that the nominal interest
rate responds strongly enough to changes in inflation (and output). We find that, likewise,
the QE rule is not always successful in anchoring expectations. Nonetheless, it successful
under a very wide range of realistically achievable values of the policy coefficients. For
example, expectations remain anchored under a special case of the QE rule in which the
level of real reserves is held completely constant, a policy which we refer to as Real Reserve
Targeting (RRT).
Second, we consider the relative performance of QE in managing business cycles, i.e. in
stabilizing output and inflation. In order to draw a fair comparison between conventional
policy and QE, we give both policies the best possible chance in achieving the stabilization
objective. This is done by evaluating both policies under the optimal policy coefficients.
We consider different types of shocks, and also different weights on output versus inflation
volatility.
A main finding is that, under a wide range of configurations, QE is actually more effective
in stabilizing output and inflation than interest rate policy. This happens as QE tends
to create a positive co-movement between output and inflation, due to aggregate demand
1An important reason for the close link between deposits and reserves is that the central bank funds its
asset purchases by creating reserves, which are held as assets by banks. In turn, banks must fund these
additional assets, which they achieve by creating deposits.
2We set aside the question of what are the optimal long-run levels of inflation, the nominal interest rates,
and the optimal long-run size and composition of the central bank balance sheet. We thus focus purely on
interest rate policy and QE as instruments for stabilization of the business cycle.
3Aside from long-term government debt, the Fed also purchased mortgage securities. We do not explicitly
model such purchases, but they would create a very similar transmission mechanism in the model. Fieldhouse
et al. (2018) provide empirical evidence that mortgage purchases by Government Sponsored Enterprises have
expansionary macro effects.
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effects. This co-movement in turn eases the trade-off between output and inflation volatility.
We further find that in many instances, RRT performs better than interest rate policy, even
though RRT is by itself a restricted and therefore suboptimal form of QE.
Third, we consider the ability of QE rules to improve welfare. We find that optimal QE
rules tend to deliver lower welfare than optimal interest rate rate rules. Moreover, aggressive
QE rules might be very detrimental to welfare. This might seem surprising, given that QE is
relatively effective in stabilizing output and inflation. However, QE comes with strong side
effects which adversely affect social welfare. In particular, when the central bank creates
movements in the amount of reserves and hence the supply of deposits, it varies the extent
to which households can insure themselves against idiosyncratic income risk. The welfare
costs of periods of low insurance are relatively large; they can dominate the total welfare
gains from periods of high insurance and from reduced volatility of inflation and output.
Thus, even though aggressive QE rules can be very powerful from a macro stabilization
standpoint, such policies might not be advisable from a welfare perspective. In fact, we find
RRT to be approximately optimal from a welfare perspective, when conventional policy is
not available.
Having studied the efficacy of QE, we apply the model to the U.S. Great Recession. To
this end, we estimate model parameters by Maximum Likelihood and match the model to
the time series for household deposits as shown in Figure 1, as well as other macro time
series. We then quantify the effects of QE using a counterfactual simulation. We find that
QE had a very large, positive impact on U.S. output and inflation between 2009 and 2012,
preventing a much deeper recession.
Finally, we explore two other unconventional policy options. The first is Forward Guid-
ance, i.e. announcements about future interest rates. We show that once a QE rule is in
place, the immediate effects of Forward Guidance are very small, which underscores the
importance of interactions between different types of unconventional policy. Second, we
consider the effects of a permanent expansion of the central bank balance sheet via QE.
Such an expansion can move the economy to a new steady state with more liquidity and
higher welfare. However, the transition path to such a new steady state is costly, due to the
aforementioned side effects on welfare. We therefore find that there is only limited scope
for improving welfare through permanent QE.
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Related literature. The neutrality of central bank balance sheet policies in standard
complete-markets models has been originally established by Wallace (1981), and was reiter-
ated more recently by Woodford (2012). The underlying theoretical argument is a variation
on the Modigliani-Miller and Ricardian Equivalence theorems. Perhaps in part because of
this striking neutrality result, much of the recent NK literature on unconventional monetary
policy has focused on Forward Guidance rather than on QE, see for instance Del Negro et al.
(2012) and McKay et al. (2016).
That said, our model does have a number of precursors. Chen et al. (2012) analyze
QE in a medium-scale DSGE model with segmented asset markets. They find that QE
only has small effects. Large effects are found by Del Negro et al. (2017), who develop a
quantitative model to evaluate the effects of liquidity provisions during the financial crisis.
In their model, liquidity interventions ease financial constraints on the production side of
the economy. A similar channel operates in Gertler and Karadi (2012). By contrast, we
focus on the role of QE as direct instrument to manage aggregate demand, which has been
used well beyond the financial crisis.
The importance of household liquidity for optimal monetary policy is emphasized by
Bilbiie and Ragot (2016). They show that liquidity frictions change the output-inflation
trade-off, as inflation affects the extent to which households can self-insure using nominal
assets. Cui (2016) studies the optimal monetary-fiscal policy mix in a model in which the
liquidity of different asset classes differs endogenously, but without QE. Harrison (2017)
studies optimal QE policy in a model with portfolio adjustment costs.
Unlike these studies, we use a quantitative model with incomplete markets in the Bewley-
Huggett-Aiyagari tradition, combined with sticky prices in the NK tradition. A number
of recent papers study the importance of household heterogeneity for the transmission of
conventional monetary policy in this type of models, see for instance Gornemann et al.
(2016), Kaplan et al. (2017), Auclert (2016), Luetticke (2015), Ravn and Sterk (2016),
Debortoli and Gal´ı (2017), Challe (2017), Hagedorn (2017), Hagedorn et al. (2017), and
Bhandari et al. (2017). Our model fits into this category, but we instead study (optimal) QE.
Heterogeneity also plays a role in Sterk and Tenreyro (2018), who study the distributional
effects of open-market operations in a flexible-price model.
Finally, various authors have studied the empirical effects of large-scale asset purchases,
generally finding evidence for expansionary macro effects. For example, Weale and Wieladek
(2016) find that in the U.S., an asset purchase of one percent of GDP leads to an increase
6
in real GDP of 0.58 percent and an increase in inflation of 0.62 percent. A survey of the
broader literature on this topic can be found in Bhattarai and Neely (2016).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple formula
for the effects of QE. The full model is presented in Section 3, whereas Section 4 discusses
the calibration and the macro effects of QE. In Section 5 we evaluate the efficacy of (optimal)
QE and conventional policy rules, while in Section 6 we estimate the model and study the
macro effects of QE in the U.S. during the Great Recession. Section 7 discusses alternative
unconventional policy options. Section 8 concludes.
2 A simple formula
Before we present the full model, we first provide a simple formula to gauge the effects of
QE on aggregate demand. To this end, let us postulate an aggregate consumption demand
function C(L, I,Γ), where L denotes the (nominal) value of fully liquid assets held by
households (e.g. deposits), I denotes the value of their illiquid, or partially liquid assets
(e.g. assets owned via mutual funds). The third argument, Γ, contains other relevant aspects
of the economy, such as prices, and is denoted by a scalar for simplicity. The (average)
marginal propensities to consume out of liquid and illiquid wealth are given by the respective
derivatives of the aggregate demand function, and will be denoted by MPCL ≡ CL(L, I,Γ)
and MPCI ≡ CI(L, I,Γ).
When the central bank conducts QE, it purchases I in exchange for L.4 Since this
is a voluntary trade, QE does not directly change the total amount of wealth owned by
households, i.e. any increase in L is matched by a decrease in I of the same magnitude. De-
noting the value of assets purchased under QE by ∆QE, the consumption function becomes
C(L + ∆QE, I − ∆QE,Γ(∆QE)). By differentiating this function with respect to ∆QE, we
obtain the following formula for the marginal effect of QE on aggregate demand:
∂C
∂∆QE
= MPCL −MPCI︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct effect
+ GE︸︷︷︸,
indirect effect
where GE ≡ CΓ(L, I,Γ) ∂Γ∂∆QE . This formula splits the effects of QE into “direct” and
“indirect” effects, in the spirit of a decomposition proposed by Kaplan et al. (2017) for
4In the full model, the central bank issues reserves, held by banks, which then create deposits to fund
those reserves.
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conventional monetary policy.
The first term captures the direct effect. It is the difference between the MPCs out of
liquid and illiquid wealth. Intuitively, QE directly triggers a liquidity transformation: it
lowers households’ illiquid wealth holdings, while increasing their liquid wealth. The direct
effect of this transformation on consumption depends on the difference in the marginal
propensities to consume out of the two types of wealth. The second term captures the
indirect general equilibrium effects triggered by QE.
Simple as it looks, the formula conveys a number of important insights. First, if the
two types of wealth were equally liquid, as in many standard models, it would hold that
MPCL = MPCI , other things equal. In this case, QE would have no direct effect on
aggregate demand, echoing the neutrality result of Wallace (1981). Second, even in the
extreme case in which MPCI = 0, QE only has large effects to the extent that the marginal
propensity to consume out of liquid wealth, MPCL, is large. This point provides a way of
understanding why for instance Chen et al. (2012) find that QE has small effects on the
real economy, as it is well known that MPCs tend to be very small in representative-agent
models. On the other hand, models with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints are
well known to generate much higher MPCs out of liquid wealth. Moreover, when certain
types of assets are subject to liquidity frictions, the MPCs out of these types of wealth tend
to be small, even in incomplete-markets models.
Finally, the indirect GE effects depend crucially on the structure of the economy and in
particular on price stickiness. With flexible prices, an increase in aggregate consumption
demand is typically dampened by an increase in prices. With sticky prices, the increase in
aggregate demand might be further amplified.
Are strong direct effects of QE in line with the data, i.e. is the difference between
MPCL and MPCI large? A substantial body of empirical studies has found MPCs out
of fully liquid wealth to be very sizable. For example, Fagereng et al. (2018) estimate an
average MPC of 63 percent in the first year, based on high-quality administrative data on
Norwegian lottery participants. The literature on MPCs out of less liquid sources of wealth
is less extensive, but generally reports much smaller MPCs. Di Maggio et al. (2018) use
Swedish data to estimate MPCs out of changes in stock market wealth, and estimate these
to lie between 5 and 14 percent, much below typical estimates for the MPCs out of fully
liquid wealth. Moreover, they report that –among the same individuals– MPCs out of fully
liquid dividend payments are much higher. The empirical evidence is thus consistent with
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sizable direct effects.
Based on the above formula, we can obtain a back-of-the-envelope estimate for the
direct effects of QE. This helps to get a sense of the quantitative importance of QE since
the Great Recession. Between 2008 and 2017, checkable deposits increased from about one
to six percent of annual GDP. Figure 1 suggests that this increase was largely driven by
QE. Assuming MPCL = 0.63 following Fagereng et al. (2018) and MPCI = 0.095, the
mid point of estimates provided by Di Maggio et al. (2018), this implies a direct effect of
(6− 1) · (0.63− 0.095) = 2.7 percent of GDP.5
Thus, the data suggest that the direct effects of QE on GDP were substantial. However,
the overall effect of QE depends also on the GE response to these direct effects. We will
use the model to evaluate the overall effects of QE.
3 The model
This section presents a fully-fledged general equilibrium model. We use the model to contrast
the effects of QE to conventional policy, allowing for a deeper understanding of when and
how to apply QE. The key features of the model are that nominal prices are sticky, that
agents face imperfectly insurable income risk, and that they hold both fully liquid and
partially liquid assets.
The model economy is populated by households, firms, banks, mutual funds, a treasury
and a central bank. The conceptual distinction between banks and mutual funds, and
between the treasury and the central bank is not strictly necessary. One might consolidate
them, but the distinction makes it easier to relate the model to reality.
Households. There is a continuum of infinitely-lived, ex-ante identical households, in-
dexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Household i’s preferences are represented by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ct(i), Nt(i)) , (1)
where Ct(i) is a basket of goods consumed in period t, Nt(i) denotes hours worked, supplied
on a competitive labor market, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. Moreover, Et
5A limitation of the back-of-the-envelope calculation is that one-year MPCs are used. The model pre-
sented in the next section accounts for cumulative effects over longer horizons.
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is the expectations operator conditional on information available in period t, and U (C,N)
is a utility function which is increasing and concave in consumption and decreasing in
hours worked. The consumption basket is given by Ct(i) ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Ct(i, j)
εt−1
εt dj
) εt
εt−1
, where
Ct(i, j) denotes the household’s consumption of good j and εt > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between goods, which is exogenous. Following the NK literature, variations in
εt can be thought of as “cost push” shocks, since they affect mark-ups charged by firms.
Household optimization implies that the price of the consumption basket is given by Pt =∫ 1
0
(Pt(j)
1−εtdj)
1
1−εt , where Pt(j) is the price of good j.
Households are subject to idiosyncratic unemployment risk. When unemployed the
household cannot supply labor, i.e. Nt(i) = 0, so it has no labor income. When employed,
the household can freely choose the number of hours worked, earning a real wage rate wt
per hour. Unemployed households become employed with an exogenous probability pUE,
whereas employed households become unemployed with a probability pEU . These transitions
take place at the very end of each period.
Households can hold deposits, denoted by Dt(i) in real terms, which pay a nominal
interest rate and are fully liquid, in the sense that there are no transaction costs involved.
Deposits provide households with a means of self insurance against the idiosyncratic income
risks associated with unemployment, helping them to cushion the decline in consumption
when they lose their job. However, households must obey a borrowing constraint:
Dt(i) ≥ χ, (2)
where −χ is a borrowing limit.
Households further own wealth stored in mutual funds. Such wealth is only partially
liquid and is therefore only of limited use as a means of self insurance. Realistically, mutual
funds often charge substantial transaction fees when a household buys into a mutual fund or
sells out of a fund, and households often rely on costly financial advice when adjusting their
financial portfolios.6 Also, and perhaps more importantly, the aforementioned empirical
evidence on MPCs out of different types of wealth strongly suggests that wealth stored in
mutual funds is much less easily spent than deposit wealth.
6Moreover, many mutual funds impose a “back-loaded” fee structure, which means that selling fees are
higher when a household has purchased the mutual fund shares relatively recently. This practice is geared
to avoid rapid outflows from a fund. Such fee structures make mutual funds an even less attractive vehicle
for self insurance.
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To capture the partial liquidity of mutual fund wealth, we assume that a household
cannot directly control the wealth stored in the fund. Instead, it receives a certain liquid
payout from the fund, denoted Xt(i). The fund potentially differentiates this amount across
households, providing an amountXt(i) = X
E
t to the employed and an amountXt(i) = X
U
t ≥
XEt to the unemployed. This differentiation captures the possibility that households may
partially draw upon mutual fund wealth to cushion the impact of job loss on consumption.
We will refer to the difference in payouts, µt ≡ XUt −XEt ≥ 0, as liquidation of mutual fund
wealth during unemployment.7
When unemployed, a household further receives an unemployment benefit given by ΘU ≥
0. This benefit is provided by a government agency which runs a balanced budget. It
therefore imposes a premium on the employed, given by u
u−1Θ
U , where u = pEU/(pEU +pUE)
is the unemployment rate.8 The budget constraint of the household, in real terms, is given
by:
Ct(i) +Dt(i) = wtNt(i) +
Rt−1
Πt
Dt−1(i) + Θt(i) +Xt(i)− Tt, (3)
where Θt(i) = Θ
U if the household is unemployed and Θt(i) = − uu−1ΘU if the household is
employed. Moreover, Rt−1 is the gross nominal interest rate on deposits from period t−1 to
period t, Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the corresponding gross rate of inflation, and Tt is a lump-sum tax
levied to finance government expenditures other than benefits. In each period, a household
i chooses Ct(i), Dt(i) and N(i) to maximize (1) subject to the constraints (2) and (3), and
the constraint that it can only supply labor when employed.
Firms. Each consumption good is produced by a different firm. The structure of household
preferences implies that firms are monopolistically competitive in the goods market. Firms
operate a linear technology using labor only, i.e. their output is given by Yt(j) = AtNt(j).
Here, At denotes Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which is exogenous and subject to
stochastic shocks.
7Strictly speaking, the fund provides some income insurance to the households by differentiating payouts.
Kaplan et al. (2017) consider a richer setup in which partially liquid wealth is subject to adjustment costs.
In their setting, households liquidate a limited amount of their partially liquid wealth following a large
enough negative income shock. Our setup captures this outcome in a simple way, enabling us to drop the
distribution of partially liquid wealth as a state variable, keeping track of only the distribution of fully liquid
wealth (i.e. deposits).
8McKay and Reis (2016) provide an in-depth analysis of the stabilization role of social insurance in a
NK model with heterogeneous agents.
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Firms also face a quadratic cost of price adjustment following Rotemberg (1982), given
in real terms by Adjt(j) = φ
(
Pt(j)−Pt−1(j)
Pt−1(j)
)2
Yt, where φ ≥ 0 is a parameter which governs
the cost of price adjustment, and Yt =
∫ 1
0
Yt(j)dj denotes aggregate output. The dividends
paid by firm j are given, in real terms, by Divt(j) =
Pt(j)
Pt
Yt(j) − wtNt(j) − Adjt(j) where
in equilibrium it holds that Pt(j) = Pt. Therefore, aggregate dividends satisfy
Divt = Yt − wtNt − Adjt, (4)
where Adjt =
∫ 1
0
Adjt(j)dj = φ (Πt − 1)2 Yt. Firms maximize the present value of profits
which leads to the following relation, commonly known as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve:
1− εt + εtwt
At
= φ (Πt − 1) Πt − φEtΛt,t+1Yt+1
Yt
(Πt+1 − 1) Πt+1, (5)
where Λt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor used by the firms and mutual funds. For
simplicity, we assume Λt,t+1 = β. We also assume that the distribution of initial prices is
the same across firms, so they behave symmetrically. Accordingly, we drop the index j from
now on.
Mutual funds. There is a representative and competitive mutual fund which owns the
equity in the firms, as well as long-term treasury debt. We model the latter following
Woodford (2001). A unit of long-term debt pays ρk dollars in any period t + k + 1 going
forward, where 0 ≤ ρ < β−1. In the steady state, the duration of long-term government
debt is given by 1
1−βρ . The budget constraint of the mutual fund is given by:
uXUt + (1− u)XEt = Divt + (1 + ρqt)
Bmt−1
Πt
− qtBmt , (6)
where Divt ≡
∫ 1
0
Divt(j)dj are aggregate dividends transferred from the firms to the fund,
Bmt is the amount of long-term treasury debt held by the mutual fund, and qt is the price
of government debt issued in period t which is determined according to:
qt = EtΛt,t+1
1 + ρqt+1
Πt+1
. (7)
Note that mutual funds do not hold deposits. In equilibrium, the return on deposits is
dominated by the return on long-term government debt. The reason is that households
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value deposits for precautionary savings reasons, which drives down the real interest rate on
deposits. If the mutual funds were to hold on to deposits, they would depress their returns
performance while at the same time deprive their owners, the households, from liquidity.
Banks. There is a perfectly competitive banking sector. Banks can hold reserves at the
central bank, denoted by Mt in real terms, which pay a nominal interest rate Rt, controlled
by the central bank. In order to fund these assets, banks must create liabilities, i.e. deposits.
No-arbitrage implies that reserves and deposits carry the same nominal interest rate Rt. In
equilibrium, banks therefore earn no profits. Consolidation of the balance sheet of the
banking sector implies that:9
1∫
0
Dt(i)di = Mt. (8)
Treasury. Real government expenditures are exogenous and denoted by Gt. In our quan-
titative exercises, we will consider shocks to Gt. The treasury targets a constant real level of
long-term debt, denoted Bt = B, during each period. The budget constraint of the treasury
is given by:
Gt = qtB − (1 + ρqt)B
Πt
+ T cbt + Tt, (9)
where T cbt is a seigniorage transfer received from the central bank.
Central bank. The central bank can issue reserves (Mt) and can also purchase long-term
government debt. The budget constraint of the central bank, in real terms, is given by:
T cbt +
Rt−1
Πt
Mt−1 + qtBcbt = Mt + (1 + ρqt)
Bcbt−1
Πt
, (10)
where Bcbt denotes the central bank’s holdings of long-term government debt. We further
assume that if the central bank purchases government debt, it finances these purchases by
issuing reserves:10
qtB
cb
t − (1 + ρqt)
Bcbt−1
Πt
= Mt − Rt−1
Πt
Mt−1. (11)
9An alternative interpretation of the model is that households can directly hold central bank liabilities
(money). It would also be straightforward to allow the banking sector to create additional deposits without
holding reserves. However, this would not impact directly on our key mechanism, which requires QE to
trigger the creation of additional deposits, as strongly suggested by Figure 1.
10Vice versa, we assume that changes in reserves are associated only with purchases/sales of government
debt. That is, we do not consider “helicopter drops”.
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We consider two versions of the model, each with a different conduct of monetary policy. In
the first version, the central bank conducts conventional interest rate policy. In this case,
the central bank sets the interest rate on reserves according to the following rule:
R̂t = Π̂t
ξRΠ Ŷ
ξRY
t , (12)
where hats denote variables relative to their steady-state values, i.e. relative to their state
variables: Ŷt ≡ Yt/Y , Π̂t ≡ Πt/Π and R̂t ≡ Rt/R , where R, Π and Y are the steady-state
values of R and Π, and Y , respectively. In the above policy rule, ξRΠ and ξ
R
Π are stabilization
coefficients which determine the response of monetary policy to fluctuations in output and
inflation. We further assume that under conventional policy the central bank does not own
any government debt (Bcbt = 0) and that the real amount of reserves (and hence aggregate
deposits) is held at a constant level (Mt = M).
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In the second version of the model, the central bank conducts QE rather than interest
rate policy. In this case, QE sets the total amount of reserves according to the following
rule:12
M̂t = Π̂
ξQEΠ
t Ŷt
ξQEY zQEt , (13)
where M̂t = Mt/M is amount of real reserves relative to the steady state and z
QE
t is
an exogenous shock to the QE rule, akin to conventional monetary policy shocks often
considered in the NK literature. We will study this shock to better understand the workings
of QE. In the above rule, ξQEΠ and ξ
QE
Y are policy coefficients which are, respectively, the
elasticities of real reserves with respect to inflation and output.
As mentioned above, the central bank implements the QE rule with purchases (or sales)
of government bonds, as in Equation (11). We further assume that when QE is used, the
nominal interest rate is pegged at Rt = R, reflecting the reality that QE is typically used
when the nominal interest rate cannot be moved.
An interesting special case of the QE rule sets both stabilization coefficients to zero, i.e.
ξQEΠ = ξ
QE
Y = 0. In this case monetary policy directly targets a certain level of real reserves
given by Mt = Mz
QE
t . We refer to this policy as Real Reserve Targeting (RRT). This policy
11We abstract from the zero lower bound on the net nominal interest rate (Rt − 1). However, we will
assume that the net nominal interest rate is pegged at zero in the model version with QE. Regarding QE
policy, we similarly do not impose a lower bound on Bcbt , i.e. the central bank itself could in principle issue
long-term debt.
12This rule can be reformulated as one in nominal reserves, the current and lagged price level and nominal
output.
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implies that, in the absence of QE shocks, the level of real reserves is constant and hence
the nominal amount of reserves moves one for one with the price level.
Equilibrium. Given laws of motion for the exogenous states {εt, At, Gt, zQEt }, the equi-
librium is defined as joint law of motion for household choices {Nt(i), Ct(i), Dt(i)}i∈[0,1],
mutual fund choices {XEt , XUt , Bmt }, lump-sum taxes and government debt {Tt, B}, cen-
tral bank choices {Rt,Mt, Bcbt , T cbt }, aggregate quantities {Yt, Nt}, prices and dividends
{Πt, wt, qt, Divt}, such that at any point in time (i) Each household i ∈ [0, 1] maximizes
(1) subject to the constraints (2) and (3); (ii) Firms in total produce Yt = AtNt, pay out
dividends according to (4), and set nominal prices such that the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (5) holds; (iii) Mutual funds pay out XEt and X
U
t = X
E
t + µt, satisfying (6); they
also price the long-term government bonds according to (7); (iv) The banks create deposit
such that (8) holds; (v) The treasury’s and central bank’s budget constraints, (9) and (10),
hold; (vi) The central bank either conducts conventional policy, i.e. it satisfies Equation
(12), and sets Bcbt = 0, and Mt = M , or it conducts QE policy, i.e. it satisfies Equations
(11) and (13), and sets Rt = R; (vii) The markets for deposits/reserves clear, i.e. Equation
(8) holds. Also the markets for long-term government debt, labor, and goods clear, i.e.
B = Bcbt +B
m
t ,
Nt =
1∫
0
Nt(i)di,
Yt =
1∫
0
Ct(i)di+Gt + φ (Πt − 1)2 Yt.
Finally, we assume that each of the stochastic driving forces z ∈ {ε, A,G, zQE} follows
an independent process of the form ln zt = (1 − λz) ln z + λz ln zt−1 + νt. Here, λz ∈ [0, 1)
is a persistence parameter and νt is an i.i.d. innovation, drawn from an distribution with
mean zero and a standard deviation given by σz ≥ 0. We allow λz and σz to potentially
differ across the four types of shocks, and we will discuss their calibration below. We further
normalize zQE = A = 1 and will discuss the calibration of G and ε below.
15
4 Household heterogeneity and the effects of QE
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and set the length of a period to one quarter.
Table 1 presents the parameter values. We assume the following utility function:
U (C,N) =
C1−σ − 1
1− σ −
κ0
1 + κ1
N1+κ1 ,
Here, σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which we set equal to one. Moreover,
κ1 > 0 is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, which is also set to one. Finally,
κ0 > 0 is a parameter scaling the disutility of labor, which we calibrate such that employed
workers on average supply N = 1/3 unit of labor in the steady state.
We further calibrate the steady-state elasticity of substitution between goods as ε = 9,
which implies a steady-state markup of 12.5 percent, and β = 0.99, which corresponds to
an annual subjective discount rate of four percent. We target an unemployment rate of
u = 0.045 and an unemployment inflow rate of pEU = 0.044, corresponding to a monthly
inflow rate of about 1.5 percent, as measured in the Current Population Survey. The implied
unemployment outflow rate is pUE = 0.934. The unemployment benefit is targeted to be 25
percent of average wage income in the steady state, which implies that ΘU = 0.25 ε−1
ε
N =
0.071.13
We assume that the mutual fund’s liquidation policy is constant over time, i.e. µt = µ ,
where we calibrate µ such that the net real interest rate on deposits in the steady state is
zero, i.e. R/Π = 1. This results in µ = 0.0634 (see Section 4.2 for more discussion on this).
The price adjustment cost parameter is set to φ = 47.1, which corresponds to an average
price duration of three quarters in the Calvo equivalent of the model.
To facilitate comparison of the two policies, we calibrate the model such that the steady
states of the model version with QE and the version with conventional policy coincide.
Specifically, we assume that in both cases the central bank targets zero inflation in the
steady state, i.e. Π = 1. The implied nominal steady-state interest rate is R = 1.14 We
13Statutory benefits are typically around 40 percent of labor income. However, the actual amount received
by households is much lower due to limited eligibility and take-up. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis
(2016) argue that taking into account all these factors reduces the benefit to around 6 percent of income.
Our calibration strikes a balance between their number and the statutory rate.
14Note that in the version with conventional policy, we abstract from the Zero Lower Bound on the nominal
interest rate. In our comparison exercises, we thus ask whether effective QE is more or less effective than
a hypothetical conventional policy that would not be subject to the ZLB. Alternatively, we could have
calibrated the model version with conventional policy to be away from the ZLB, but this would make a
clear comparison more difficult since the steady states of the two model versions would be different.
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Table 1: Parameter values and steady-state targets.
Parameter Description Value Notes
β subjective discount factor 0.99 subjective annual discount rate: 4%
σ coefficient of relative risk aversion 1 convention
κ0 labor disutility parameter 11.4296 average labor supply employed: 1/3
κ1 inverse Frisch elasticity 1 convention
pEU unemployment inflow rate 0.044 monthly rate: 1.5% (CPS)
pUE unemployment outflow rate 0.934 steady-state unemployment rate: 4.5%
ΘU unemployment benefit 0.0741 benefit 25% of avg. real wage
µ mutual fund liquidation coefficient 0.0634 real interest rate: 0 %
χ borrowing limit 0 see footnote 15
ε¯ elasticity of substitution varieties 9 markup: 12.5%
φ price adjustment cost parameter 47.1 average price duration: 3 quarters
G real government expenditures 0.0732 expenditures-to-annual-output: 23%
B government debt parameter 0.0398 median holdings liquid wealth (SCF), see text
ρ decay government debt 0.9470 duration of government debt: 4 years
D = M steady-state deposits (=reserves) 0.1009 deposits-to-annual-output (FoF): 7.5%
Π long-run inflation target 1 net inflation rate: 0%
further set ρ = 0.947, which implies a duration of government debt of four years. The
borrowing limit,−χ, is set to zero.15
The steady-state values of government expenditures, deposits and government debt, i.e.,
G, D = M, and B are chosen to hit the following targets. We target a ratio of government
expenditures to output of 23 percent, in line with national accounts data, and a deposit-
to-annual-output ratio of 7.5 percent, in line with data from the Flow Of Funds (FoF)
accounts. Moreover, we target data on liquid wealth from the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF). In particular, we target the median amount of transaction accounts (deposits in the
model) held by a household with median income, as a fraction of (pre-tax) median income.
This ratio is about 26 percent in the SCF, averaged over the years 1989-2016. While not
explicitly targeted, our model implies a ratio of the value of government debt to annual
output, i.e. qB
4Y
of 58 percent.
15We have solved a model with a positive borrowing limit. We obtained very similar results to our
baseline, since we target the same steady-state real interest rate. Details of this version are available upon
requests.
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4.1 Computation
In the next section, we will analyze the dynamics of the model in response to aggregate
shocks. As in typical heterogeneous-agents models, the wealth distribution then becomes a
time-varying state, which generally makes it difficult to solve for the equilibrium (let alone
search for optimal policy parameters or estimate the model), see for instance Krusell and
Smith (1998).
In our case, it turns out that the model can be solved much faster and more easily
than is often the case. In particular, the wealth distribution can be represented as a finite-
dimensional object, due to the fact that the amount of liquidity in the steady state is not too
large. Under these circumstances, all those who become unemployed exhaust their deposits
within the first quarter, hitting the borrowing constraint right away. This implies that
all employed households with the same employment duration behave identically, as do the
newly unemployed with the same employment duration before lob loss, and those who have
been unemployed for more than one quarter.
Figure 2: Decision rules (steady state).
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Notes: markers denote mass points of the liquid wealth distribution observed in the steady-state equilibrium.
The black line is the 45-degree line.
We exploit this outcome, to solve the model as easily as a typical medium-scale DSGE
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model with a representative agent. In particular, we group agents who were employed in
quarter t − 1 into cohorts, indexed by the length of the employment spell in the previous
quarter, denoted by k ≥ 0. The cohort with k = 0 is entirely employed and all enter the
period with zero deposits as they were previously unemployed. Hence they make identical
decisions. Therefore, agents in cohort k = 1 all start with the same level of deposits, Dt−1(i).
Hence, conditional on their employment status, all agents within cohort k = 1 make the
same decisions. Extending this logic, within any cohort k ≥ 1 a fraction pEU of the agents
has become unemployed in the current quarter. They all behave identically and move out
of the cohort in the next quarter. The remaining fraction of the cohort 1 − pEU remains
employed. Again, they all behave identically and move on to become cohort k + 1 in the
next quarter. Turning to the households who were unemployed in quarter t − 1, we note
that all behave identically as they have depleted their deposits.
Figure 2 illustrates the steady-state choices of deposits and consumption of the different
cohorts. Note that for larger values of the employment spell k, cohorts converge to a certain
level of deposits and consumption. We use a total of 75 cohorts, and group all cohorts with
k ≥ K into one bin. We thus need to keep track of K state variables characterizing the
wealth distribution. In our quantitative exercises, we set K = 75. The precise value of the
cutoff K is quantitatively irrelevant as long as it is not too small. To appreciate this point,
note that from Figure 2 it can be seen the behavior of cohorts beyond k = 15 is almost
indistinguishable.
To solve the model, we apply a first-order perturbation method for dynamic analysis,
using the popular dynare software package. Our method may be of independent interest
and is described in more detail in the Appendix.16
4.2 Model implications for micro-level consumption
We now explore the implications of the calibration for micro-level consumption behavior,
and in particular for Marginal Propensities to Consume. This is important since the simple
formula presented in Section 2 makes clear that these MPCs are key determinants of the
16We thus keep track of K = 75 variables characterizing the wealth distribution. However, we obtained
very similar results with as few as K = 20 state variables. This is a much lower number than required by
similar, perturbation-based solution methods. For example, the popular method of Reiter (2009) typically
requires hundreds of state variables to obtain good accuracy. LeGrand and Ragot (2017) solve models by
truncating idiosyncratic histories. In our application, even with a truncation cutoff lowered to K = 20, this
would still imply 220 state variables, i.e. more than a million.
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Figure 3: Average Marginal Propensities to Consume (steady state).
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Notes: the figure shows average MPCs across households. The model MPC out of liquid wealth is computed
as the response of a household to a surprise marginal amount of additional deposit wealth. The model MPC
out of illiquid wealth is computed by giving the households a surprise unit of wealth stored in the mutual
fund (see the main text for more details). Both types of MPCs are computed using a first-order perturbation
method, keeping all aggregates (including prices) constant.
power of QE. We evaluate MPCs at different horizons, the importance of which has been
recently emphasized by Auclert et al. (2018).
Figure 3 shows the average MPC out of liquid wealth across households, cumulated over
time and evaluated at the steady state of the economy. In the initial quarter, household
spend on average 17 percent of additional liquid wealth. Over the first year, the MPC out
of liquid wealth is about 59 percent. The model also plots the average empirical MPCs out
of liquid wealth as estimated by Fagereng et al. (2018) for Norwegian households, which
turn out to be somewhat higher than in the model, depending on the horizon. Over longer
horizons, the cumulative MPCs do not converge to one, since households use part of the
additional wealth to reduce labor supply.
Analogously, the dashed line in Figure 3 plots the average MPC out of illiquid (partially
liquid) wealth. To compute this MPC, we surprise a household with an additional amount
of firm equity wealth stored in the mutual fund, which in perpetuity pays off additional
dividends. The amount of firm equity given to the household is chosen such that the present
value of the additional dividends is equivalent to one unit of consumption. Here, the present
value is computed assuming an 8 percent annual discount rate, in line with average equity
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returns observed in the data. Clearly, MPCs out of illiquid wealth are much lower than
MPCs out of liquid wealth. Over the first year, the MPC is 9 percent, which is in the range
of estimates provided by Di Maggio et al. (2018), based on Swedish data.
Thus, our low-liquidity calibration successfully matches recent empirical evidence on
MPCs out of both liquid and illiquid wealth. As a direct result, the model also matches well
the difference in MPCs out of liquid and illiquid wealth, which is crucial for the strength
of the direct effects generated by QE, as argued previously. If anything, the model might
slightly understate this difference.
One might also wonder about the ability of households to smooth consumption in the
face of unemployment shocks. The left panel of Figure 4 plots the model-implied drop in
consumption upon job loss, as a function of the household’s position in the distribution
of liquid wealth (deposits). The line is downward-sloping, as households with more liquid
wealth are better able cushion the consumption effect of becoming unemployed. The average
consumption drop is 22 percent, which is very close to the empirical estimate of Chodorow-
Reich and Karabarbounis (2016), who report a 21 percent drop based on data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey.
The right panel of Figure 4 shows the composition of the “consumption cushion” upon
job loss. The cushion is defined as the difference between the drop in labor income and the
drop in consumption upon job loss. Between 30 and 40 percent of the consumption cushion
is financed by unemployment benefits, depending on the amount of liquid assets owned by
the households. These benefits directly help households alleviate the fall in consumption.
Around 30 percent of the consumption cushion is due to the liquidation of mutual fund
wealth. The remainder of the cushion is due to the withdrawal of deposits.
4.3 The impact of a QE shock
Before we compare the efficacy of QE to conventional policy, we conduct a simple experiment
which helps to understand how QE affects inflation and the real economy. To this end, we
consider an exogenous shock to QE, i.e., a positive innovation to zQEt . For transparency, we
consider a version with Real Reserve Targeting (RRT, i.e. ξQEΠ = ξ
QE
Y = 0), so that there
is no feedback from output and inflation to real reserves. The shock is scaled such that
real reserves (Mt) increase by 1 percent of annual output on impact. We further assume a
persistence coefficient of λzQE = 0.9, which implies that the QE expansion has a half life of
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Figure 4: Consumption behavior upon job loss.
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Notes: the black line in the left panel plots 100 · (1 − Ct(i)/Ct−1(i)) for households who lost their jobs
in the current quarter t. The right panel shows the contributions of the components of the “consumption
cushion”, for households who lost their job in the current quarter t. The consumption cushion is defined
as cusht(i) ≡ wt−1Nt−1(i) − (Ct−1(i) − Ct(i)). The contribution of unemployment benefit is computed as
(ΘU − ΘE)/cusht(i), the contribution of liquidation of mutual funds as µ/cusht(i), and the contribution
of deposit withdrawal is computed as (Dt(i) − Dt−1(i)))/cusht(i). Both panels show outcomes in the
deterministic steady state.
about 1.7 years.
The black solid lines in Figure 5 plot the responses to the QE expansion in the base-
line model. Immediately after the central bank starts purchasing government debt, output
increases by 1.09 percent on impact and by 0.61 percent on average during the first year
following the intervention. Inflation also responds strongly. One year after the intervention,
the price level has increased by 1.16 percent. Real wages also increase substantially, reflect-
ing the increase in labor demand which ensues from the increase in goods demand. As QE
is rolled back, this increase dies out.
Next, we consider a version of the model with flexible prices (i.e. setting φ = 0),
illustrated by the blue dashed lines in Figure 5. In this case, the effect on output is much
smaller, whereas there is a large spike in inflation on impact. Intuitively, the increase in
prices strongly dampens the increase in goods demand following the QE intervention. That
is, indirect effects mostly offset the direct effects. Real wages remain constant under flexible
prices. The fact that the QE shock still creates a small increase in output under flexible
prices is associated with labor supply effects and re-distributions of nominal wealth.
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Figure 5: Responses to an expansionary QE shock.
0 5 10 15 20
quarter
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
%
 o
f s
.s
. a
nn
ua
l o
ut
pu
t
real reserves
0 5 10 15 20
quarter
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
%
-p
oi
nt
s
inflation
0 5 10 15 20
quarter
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
%
output
baseline
flexible prices
quick exit
0 5 10 15 20
quarter
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
%
real wage
Notes: the shock is scaled such that real reserves increase by an amount equivalent to one percent of annual
output on impact. The policy rule assumes ξQEΠ = ξ
QE
Y = 0 (Real Reserve Targeting). The baseline and
flexible price responses assume a persistence coefficient of λzQE = 0.9, whereas the “quick exit” response
assumes a persistence coefficient of λzQE = 0.5.
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Finally, the green solid line in Figure 5 shows the effects in the baseline model when the
QE expansion is less persistent, setting λzQE = 0.5, so that the exit is quicker. In that case,
the initial expansion in output and inflation is much smaller. Intuitively, the contractionary
effects associated with the quick unwinding of QE are immediately anticipated following
the intervention, which dampens its effectiveness on impact. Thus, the overall power of a
QE intervention depends crucially not only on the degree of price stickiness, but also on
expectations regarding its persistence.
5 The efficacy of QE versus conventional policy
We now evaluate the efficacy of QE, drawing a comparison to conventional policy. We
compare the two policies along three dimensions. First, we consider their ability to anchor
expectations and thereby rule out expectations-driven fluctuations. Second, we evaluate
their success in stabilizing output and inflation, traditionally a key objective of central
banks. Finally, we consider their ability to mitigate the welfare costs of business cycles.
The latter is affected not only by output and inflation volatility, but also by considerations
regarding self-insurance and inequality.
5.1 Anchoring expectations
A widely appreciated objective of monetary policy is to anchor expectations. When ex-
pectations become disanchored, high inflation or deflation may arise purely due to changes
in beliefs about the future. The “Taylor principle”, arguably the most celebrated policy
recommendation of the NK model, concerns precisely this issue. The principle states that
the central bank should let the nominal interest rate respond sufficiently aggressively to
movements in inflation and/or output. When policy satisfies the Taylor principle, expec-
tations remain anchored and belief-driven fluctuations are ruled out. Clarida et al. (2000)
argue that a switch from passive to aggressive interest rate policy policy since Fed president
Paul Volcker contributed to a dramatic decline in inflation and output volatility.
In December 2008, the Federal Funds rate was reduced to (almost) zero and stayed
there until 2016. Potentially, this opened up the door to a disanchoring of expectations,
as the ability of interest rate policy to respond to output and inflation had been curtailed.
However, this does not happen if subsequent unconventional policy is able to successfully
replace conventional policy and thus re-anchor expectations.
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Figure 6: Determinacy under an interest rate rule and a QE rule.
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Notes: determinacy outcomes are obtained by analyzing the eigenvalues of the system of model equations,
after a first-order perturbation around the deterministic steady state. “Determinacy” refers to an outcome
in which the number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle coincides with the number of state variables in
the system, whereas “Indeterminacy” (“Instability”) refers to an outcome in which there are more (fewer)
eigenvalues inside the unit circle than there are state variables.
We now use the model to investigate the ability of QE and conventional policy to avoid
belief-driven fluctuations. In more technical terms, we investigate whether the equilibrium is
locally determinate around the steady state under each of the two policy rules. To this end,
we consider a range of values for the stabilization coefficients of the interest rate rule and the
QE rule. For ease of interpretation, we introduce re-scaled versions of the QE stabilization
coefficients: ξ˜QEY ≡ M4Y ξ
QE
Y and ξ˜
QE
Π ≡ M16Y ξ
QE
Π . Here, ξ˜
QE
Y is the response of reserves –in
units of annual steady-state output– to a one percent increase in output. Moreover, ξ˜QEΠ is
the response of reserves –again in units of annual steady-state output– to a one percentage
point increase in annualized inflation.
Figure 6 illustrates the outcomes regarding local determinacy under the various policy
configurations. The left panel shows outcomes under the QE rule, for a range of values of
ξ˜QEY and ξ˜
QE
Π . The figure shows that local determinacy does not arise under all combinations
of the QE coefficients. In particular, it may fail to hold when the coefficient on inflation
is sufficiently negative. The threshold for determinacy lies at around ξ˜QEΠ = −0.5.17 By
17Recall that this value of the policy coefficient means that in response to a 1 percentage point decline
in annual inflation, the central bank buys government debt worth of 0.5 percent of annual GDP. To better
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contrast, the output coefficient ξ˜QEY has relatively little impact on equilibrium determinacy.
Still, the equilibrium is locally determinate under a wide range of realistically achievable
parameters of the QE rule. For example, determinacy is obtained under a Real Reserve
Targeting (RRT) policy which sets ξ˜QEΠ = ξ˜
QE
Y = 0. Intuitively, by targeting the amount of
real reserves, the central bank creates a real anchor to the expectations of households and
firms.
The right panel of Figure 6 shows outcomes under conventional policy, i.e. an interest
rate rule. A substantial region of the parameter space implies local indeterminacy. Only if
ξRΠ and ξ
R
Y are sufficiently high do we obtain determinacy. This reflects the Taylor Principle,
which states that in a basic NK model ξRΠ > 1 is typically a necessary and sufficient condition
for determinacy (given ξRY = 0). Figure 6 shows that this result applies approximately also
to the incomplete-markets model considered here, although not precisely.
5.2 Managing aggregate fluctuations
Having established that QE can be an effective instrument to anchor expectations, we now
study its power in mitigating fluctuations in aggregate output and inflation, relative to
conventional policy. To this end, we set up a direct horse race between the two policy rules.
Let us introduce the following loss function:
L(ω) = ωV ar(Ŷt) + (1− ω)V ar(Π̂t).
The loss function is a weighted average of the unconditional volatility of output and inflation,
where the parameter ω ∈ [0, 1] controls the relative weight given to output volatility.
Our purpose is to compare the ability of QE and conventional policy rules to minimize
the loss L. To compare the two types of policy on a fair basis, we evaluate the two rules at the
optimal values of the policy rule coefficients, given L(ω). In this way, the two policy rules are
each given the best possible chance in achieving the objective. To implement this strategy,
we first search over the values of, respectively, {ξ˜QEΠ , ξ˜QEY } and {ξRΠ , ξRY } which minimize
L(ω), and do so for a range of value of ω between zero and one, each time computing the
minimized objective. We also compute L(ω) under Real Reserve Targeting (RRT). In that
understand why determinacy is not obtained under sufficiently negative values of ξ˜QEΠ , note from Figure
5 that expansionary QE initially increases inflation, but reduces it over longer horizons. When ξ˜QEΠ < 0
a positive feedback between QE and inflation arises over longer horizons, which undermines a unique and
stable equilibrium path.
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Figure 7: Loss function under different shocks and policy configurations.
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Notes: value of 100 · L(ω) as a function of the output weight ω, under the optimal interest rate rule, the
optimal QE rule, and the RRT rule. The optimal rules were found by searching for the values of the policy
coefficients ({ξ˜QEΠ , ξ˜QEY } in case of QE, {ξRΠ , ξRY } in case of conventional policy) which minimize L(ω), given
ω. To this end, we constructed a large grid for each of the two sets of policy coefficients, and solved the
model at each of the grid points. Next, we constructed a grid for ω and searched for the policy coefficients
which minimize L(ω) for a given value of ω. We did so individually for each of the three types of aggregate
shocks, under our baseline calibration with sticky prices.
case, we simply fix the QE rule coefficients to ξ˜QEΠ = ξ˜
QE
Y = 0 rather than searching for
optimal parameters.
We consider, individually, three types of aggregate shocks: cost push shocks, TFP shocks,
and government expenditure shocks, as defined previously. In each of the three cases, we
assume a persistence parameter of λzQE = 0.9 and set the volatility of the shock innovations,
σz, such that under an interest rate rule with ξ
R
Π = 1.5 and ξ
R
Y = 0, the unconditional
volatility of output is one percent.
Figure 7 plots the objective under the optimal interest rate rule, the optimal QE rule,
and under RRT, for the three types of shock and the full range of output volatility weights.
A striking outcome revealed by the figure is that, under a wide range of configurations, the
QE policy rule is substantially more successful in stabilizing business cycles than the interest
rate rule. This is particularly the case for intermediate values of ω, i.e. when the objective
is to stabilize both output and inflation. When the objective is mainly to stabilize inflation
(i.e. ω is close to zero) or output (i.e. ω is close to one), the performance of the two rules
is similar. We thus find that QE is not only an effective substitute for conventional policy
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Figure 8: Responses to a cost push shock.
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Notes: responses to a cost push shock (i.e. a shock to εt) under the optimal QE rule, the optimal interest
rate rule, both given an output weight of ω = 0.75, and the RRT rule. See the main text and the note of
Figure 7 for details.
to anchor expectations, but also to simultaneously stabilize aggregate output and inflation.
RRT is by construction less successful than the optimal QE rule, since RRT is nested
in the QE rule. But interestingly, in a wide range of cases RRT actually performs better
than the optimal interest rate rule, even though under RRT the policy rule coefficients have
been fixed rather than optimized. Thus, despite being a very simple policy, RRT rivals
conventional interest rate policy, both in terms of anchoring expectations and in terms of
stabilizing output and inflation.
To understand why the QE rule and RRT are relatively successful in stabilizing both
output and inflation, it is useful to consider the co-movement between the two variables.
When the two variables co-move imperfectly, it is generally difficult to stabilize both vari-
ables with conventional monetary policy, given that a change in the interest rate tends to
move both variables in the same direction. This is illustrated in Figure 8, which shows the
responses to a cost push shock. Under the (optimal) interest rate rule, output and inflation
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move in opposite directions following the shock. If the interest rate rule were more aggres-
sive on inflation, the volatility of inflation would be dampened but the volatility of output
would be increased, and vice versa.
Under QE and RRT, however, output and inflation co-move much more positively, which
eases the policy trade-off. To understand what gives rise to the positive co-movement, note
that the nominal interest rate is pegged under QE. Therefore, the expected real interest
rate is given by Et RΠt+1 , where R is fixed. Since a persistent cost push shock triggers a
persistent increase in inflation, the real interest rate must fall. A decline in the real interest
rate in turn stimulates aggregate consumption demand, pushing up output. Hence, output
and inflation move in the same direction. By contrast, under conventional policy the real
interest rate is given by Et RtΠt+1 , where Rt can move. Under the Taylor principle, the central
bank increases the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with inflation, which tends
to create an increase rather than a decrease in the real interest rate. This in turn lowers
consumption demand and pushes down output, exacerbating the negative co-movement.
5.3 Improving social welfare
So far, we have found that QE can be very effective in achieving two traditionally important
central bank objectives: anchoring expectations and stabilizing the aggregate business cycle.
We now consider the broader welfare implications. In representative-agent NK models,
welfare is typically well approximated by a weighted combination of only the volatility
of output and inflation. In that case, the sort of analysis we conducted in the previous
subsection could also be used to evaluate the broader welfare effects of monetary policy
rules.
In heterogeneous-agents economies like the one considered here, there is no direct map-
ping from aggregate output and inflation volatility to welfare. With incomplete markets and
idiosyncratic risk, welfare also depends on factors concerning consumption insurance and
inequality, which play no role in representative-agent models. Therefore, policies which are
successful in stabilizing output and inflation might be undesirable from a broader welfare
perspective. Moreover, optimal policy might sacrifice stability of output and inflation in
order to avoid undesirable side effects on inequality.
To investigate these issues, we introduce the following utilitarian welfare objective, taken
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from a timeless perspective:
W = E
∫ 1
0
U (C(i), N(i)) di,
where E is the unconditional expectations operator. Given this objective, we repeat the
exercise of the previous subsection. That is, we again search for the policy parameters which
optimize the objective, and then evaluate welfare under the optimal policy coefficients. As
before we consider cost push shocks, TFP shocks and government expenditure shocks, and
we also evaluate the objective under RRT.
Figure 5.3 is a contour plot of welfare outcomes for different values of the policy co-
efficients under QE and the interest rate rule. Red markers indicate the optimal policy
coefficients, and the numbers next to the markers denote the associated welfare outcome.
The latter is measured as a welfare cost of business cycles, expressed in percentages of
average consumption in the steady state. Blue markers indicate Real Reserve Targeting
(RRT).
Three striking results follow from Figure 5.3. First, welfare under the optimal QE
policy and RRT is generally lower than welfare under the optimal interest rate rule. The
only exception is the government expenditure shock, under which the optimal QE policy
performs marginally better. Under the cost push shock, however, the optimal QE policy
performs substantially worse than the optimal interest rate rule. Second, under all three
shocks the optimal QE rule is still quite successful in mitigating the welfare costs of business
cycles, generating a loss equivalent to only 0.01 percent of consumption.18 However, away
from the optimal policy coefficients welfare can drop sharply. The dark blue areas in the
left panels in Figure 5.3 denote configurations for which the welfare cost exceeds 0.3 percent
of steady-state consumption; in some cases the cost is much more than that. Under the
interest rule, by contrast, welfare is much less sensitive to the precise policy coefficients.
Third, the optimal QE policy is similar to RRT, both in terms of the coefficients and in
terms of the associated welfare outcome.
To understand these results, it is helpful to consider in more detail the side effects that
QE can have on insurance and inequality. Note that when ξ˜QEΠ and ξ˜
QE
Y are unequal to zero,
the aggregate amount of reserves and hence the supply of deposits varies over the business
cycle, as the central bank adjusts the amount of QE in response to changes in inflation and
18Recall that the shock volatility parameter σz was calibrated such that under an interest rate rule with
ξRΠ = 1.5 and ξ
R
Y = 0, the volatility of aggregate output is one percent.
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Figure 9: Welfare impact of business cycles (% s.s. consumption).
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Notes: Welfare impact of business cycles as a function of the policy coefficients, expressed as percentage
equivalents of average steady-state consumption. Yellow (dark blue) areas denote the highest (lowest) levels
of welfare. Red round markers indicated the optimal policy, whereas blue square markers indicate RRT.
We constructed a grid for the policy coefficients, solved the model at each grid point, and computed welfare
(W). We then considered a steady-version of the model with an additional lump-sum tax, τ c. We then
solved for the level of τ c which renders welfare in this steady-state model exactly equal to the model with
shocks, on each of the grid point. The figure plots −τ c as a percentage of average steady-state consumption.
The top row show results for the model with cost push shocks, the middle row for a model with TFP shocks,
and the bottom row for a model with government expenditure shocks. Shock volatility parameters were
calibrated such that under an interest rate rule with ξRΠ = 1.5 and ξ
R
Y = 0, the volatility of aggregate output
is one percent.
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Figure 10: Welfare impact of business cycles (% s.s. consumption) under sticky and flexible
prices
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model and under flexible prices (φ = 0), setting ξQEY = ξ
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Y = 0. See the note of Figure 9 for a description
of the procedure.
output. The variation in reserves in turn creates time variation in the supply of deposits, and
hence in the extent to which households can insure themselves against idiosyncratic income
risks. Via this channel, QE can contribute to time variation in consumption inequality.
Periods of low insurance push unemployed households closer to zero consumption, which
creates relatively large welfare costs given that households are risk averse. These adverse side
effects on welfare may prompt the central bank to keep real reserves more or less constant
even if this means that fluctuations in aggregate output and inflation are larger than they
could be under more active QE policy. By contrast, conventional policy does not directly
affect the amount of insurance, and hence conventional policy comes with less severe side
effects on welfare.
These points are illustrated in Figure 10, which plots welfare in the baseline model as
well as in a version with flexible prices, both under different policy configurations. For
simplicity, we vary only the stabilization coefficients on inflation i.e. we set ξQEY = ξ
R
Y = 0.
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The right column of Figure 10 show that under conventional policy, the removal of price
stickiness creates a much flatter welfare function. Intuitively, under flexible prices monetary
policy is unable to affect output and inflation the Phillips Curve. As the traditional lever of
monetary policy has been removed, the precise aggressiveness of the policy becomes close
to irrelevant to welfare.
By contrast, removing price stickiness under the QE rule creates more curvature in the
welfare function. That is, when prices are flexible the values of the stabilization coefficients
matter even more for welfare. This indicates that under the QE rule, much of the welfare
effects of the stabilization policy operate not via the traditional monetary policy channel of
the NK model, but rather via direct side effects on welfare and insurance. Therefore, the
optimal QE rule is geared towards avoiding the side effects which come with time-variation
in deposit supply, rather than towards stabilizing aggregate output and inflation.19
6 The macro effects of QE since the Great Recession
In this section we quantify the macro effects of QE on the U.S. economy since the Great Re-
cession, when the nominal interest rate was at the zero lower bound, starting from 2008Q3.
To this end, we structurally estimate the model, using data on the deviation of real output
from its potential, the government-spending-to-output ratio, the deposits-to-output ratio,
and CPI inflation. To measure potential output, we use estimates from the Congressional
Budget Office. The data are normalized around 2008Q3 and are shown in Figure 11.
We estimate the version of the model with QE, and four shocks: cost push shocks,
TFP shocks, government expenditure shocks, and QE shocks. We assume that all four
shocks follow first-order autoregressive processes, as before, and we estimate the associated
parameters. One might think of QE shocks as discretionary policy interventions. At the
same time we also allow for systematic responses via the QE rule, and we estimate the
stabilization coefficients on output and inflation. The remaining parameters are calibrated
as described above. The model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood.
Table 2 displays the estimated parameter values. The implied magnitude of QE shocks
is substantial. At the same time, we also find a systematic component to the QE rule.
19Note that under flexible prices, fluctuations in inflation are typically larger than under sticky prices.
Given a QE rule with a certain non-zero coefficient on inflation, this generates larger fluctuations in the
amount of reserves, and hence deposits. Therefore, welfare becomes more sensitive to the QE policy coeffi-
cients.
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In particular, we estimate the coefficient on inflation ξ˜QEΠ to be significantly negative. The
point estimate for ξ˜QEY is positive, though not very significantly so. Thus, QE since the Great
Recession appears best described as a mix of systematic and discretionary interventions.
Table 2: Estimated parameter values.
Parameter Description value std. error t-statistic
λε persistence cost push shock 0.014 0.317 0.044
λA persistence TFP shock 0.965 0.031 31.479
λG persistence G shock 0.995 0.019 51.288
λzQE persistence QE shock 0.738 0.052 11.837
σε st.dev. cost push innovation 0.118 0.026 4.574
σA st.dev. TFP innovation 0.005 0.001 4.602
σG st.dev. G innovation 0.007 0.001 6.516
σzQE st.dev. QE innovation 0.158 0.032 4.890
ξ˜QEY QE coef. output 0.389 0.196 1.982
ξ˜QEΠ QE coef. inflation -0.396 0.119 3.335
Notes: parameters have been estimated using Maximum Likelihood. See the main text and Appendix for
a description of the data series and the sample period.
With the estimated model at hand, we quantify the effects of active QE on the macro
economy. We do so by simulating a counterfactual in which we both set ξ˜QEY = ξ˜
QE
Π = 0
and shut down the QE shocks. In this case, real reserves and deposits remain fixed at their
steady-state level throughout the sample period.
Figure 11 shows the results of this counterfactual. The difference between the two lines in
the upper left panel captures the Fed’s asset purchases, which resulted in large-scale deposit
creation. The lower right panel shows that QE had a large positive impact on aggregate
output. Without active QE interventions, the recession would have been much deeper. For
example, the fall in output relative to potential would have been about 10%, compared to
about 1.7% at the beginning of QE in 2008Q3. Note that this effect is much larger than
the direct effect computed in Section 2. Thus, in the initial years the direct effects of QE
were amplified by general equilibrium effects. However, after the recession the effects of
QE gradually fade out, even though the policy itself had not been rolled back. Over longer
horizons, general equilibrium effects turn from an amplifying into a dampening factor, as
prices have had more time to adjust. Note also that the third round of QE did not create
large additional effects, according to the model, as it had been anticipated by the private
sector.
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Figure 11: The impact of QE in the U.S. since the Great Recession
Notes: data series and a counterfactual simulation without QE. For a description of the data series, see
the main text and also Appendix A. In the counterfactual, we set ξ˜QEY = ξ˜
QE
Π = 0 and shut down the QE
shocks. Grey areas denote rounds of QE purchases by the Federal Reserve. Time series have been
normalized around 2008Q3.
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Figure 11 also shows large positive effect of QE on inflation, although this effect was rel-
atively short-lived and switched sign during 2013. The latter result reflects the overshooting
of inflation also visible in Figure 5. In these responses, the effect on inflation dies out much
faster than the effect on output.
7 Other unconventional policy options
In this section, we discuss two alternative unconventional policies. We will first consider
Forward Guidance, and then analyze the potential benefits of “permanent” QE.
7.1 Forward Guidance
Among unconventional policies, the main alternative to QE is Forward Guidance: an an-
nouncement about monetary policy in the future. In the standard NK model without QE,
Forward Guidance is an extremely effective policy once the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate binds. In fact, macroeconomic responses to Forward Guidance turn out to be
so enormous that they might call into question the basic tenets of the NK model, see Del
Negro et al. (2012).
To address this puzzle, McKay et al. (2016) revisit the effects of Forward Guidance
in an incomplete-markets NK model (without QE). They show that the output response
to a five-year-ahead announcement is dampened substantially, relative to a representative-
agent version of the model. Nonetheless, the effects of Forward Guidance remain large
in comparison to empirical evidence, as presented for instance in Del Negro et al. (2012).
Hagedorn et al. (2017) consider an incomplete-markets NK model with a target for nominal
expenditure growth and show that in this setting the effects of Forward Guidance are much
smaller.
We explore the effects of Forward Guidance in our model, with a QE policy on the part of
the central bank. For transparency, we assume that a QE rule with Real Reserve Targeting
is in place, i.e. we set ξQEΠ = ξ
QE
Y = 0. We then consider a pre-announced decline in the
nominal interest rate of 50 basis points (corresponding to about 2 percentage points on an
annualized basis) which lasts for one quarter. During all other periods, the net nominal
interest rate remains fixed at zero. We consider a Forward Guidance announcement two
years ahead, and another one five years ahead.
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Figure 12 shows the effects of the two Forward Guidance shocks. The figure shows that
once the nominal interest rate is actually reduced, there is a strong decline in the real interest
rate. During the quarters leading up to the implementation there is a small expansion
in output, followed by a minor contraction after the implementation. Importantly, the
output increase in the initial period of the announcement is almost negligible.20 The impact
response of the real interest rate (and hence inflation) is also extremely small. Moreover,
the initial responses are declining in the announcement horizon. Finally, the lower right
panel of Figure 12 shows that the Forward Guidance shock does have a substantial initial
effect on the price of long-run treasury debt.
We thus conclude that once we account for incomplete markets and QE policy, the effects
of forward guidance on output and inflation are no longer puzzlingly large. Rather, they
are very small. An implication of this finding is that, in comparison, QE stands out as the
more effective stabilization policy, at least when the nominal interest rate is immutable in
the short run.
7.2 Permanent QE
Finally, we explore the possibility of “permanent QE”, i.e. a central bank purchase of
government debt which is never reversed. Potentially, such a policy could improve welfare
as it increases the amount of liquidity in the hands of households, enabling them to better
self-insure against idiosyncratic income risk. One may therefore wonder if it is optimal in
our model for the central bank to conduct large permanent QE operations, flooding the
market with liquidity.
We explore this possibility in the model, by simulating the effects of a (semi-) perma-
nent increase (or decrease) in real reserves implemented via QE. We do so for a range of
magnitudes of the QE intervention and compute the impact on welfare in each case. Figure
13 shows the results of this exercise. The red dashed line shows the level of welfare in the
new steady state as a function of the level of reserves in the new steady state, excluding the
transition path. As expected, welfare is increasing in the amount of steady-state liquidity
(reserves).
The blue solid line again shows the effect of permanent QE on welfare, but this time
20The output response is less than 0.0002 percent. Putting this number in perspective, McKay et al. (2016)
report an initial output increase of 0.25 (0.1) percent under complete (incomplete) markets, in response to
a forward guidance shock to the real interest rate of 50 basis points, 20 quarters ahead.
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Figure 12: Responses to a Forward Guidance shock.
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Figure 13: Welfare impact of permanent QE.
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including welfare along the transition path towards the new steady state. Interestingly, it is
no longer the case that welfare is monotonically increasing in the size of the QE intervention.
This happens as the transition to the new steady state is costly from a welfare perspective,
due to the side effects created by QE. For instance, the announcement of permanent QE
drives up aggregate demand, and hence the wage rate which in turn reduces firms’ markups.
The latter two effects create a redistribution from the employed to the unemployed, which
is unfavorable from a social welfare perspective. We find that welfare is maximized at a
level of reserves that is around 13 percent higher than in the original steady state (indicated
by a red marker), which corresponds to a 3.8 percent increase in reserves as a fraction of
annual output. Thus, the scope for improving welfare by permanently flooding the market
with liquidity is rather limited, once the transition path to the new steady state is taken
into account.
8 Concluding remarks
We have used a quantitative New Keynesian model with incomplete markets and fully
and partially liquid assets to study the efficacy of Quantitative Easing (QE) as a cyclical
stabilization instrument, relative to conventional interest rate policy. The direct impact of
QE is determined by the difference in marginal propensities to consume out of the two types
of wealth, which is large according to recent empirical evidence.
Our main finding is that a QE rule can be a very effective tool to stabilize the macro
economy and that it has greatly dampened the decline in output during the Great Recession.
We also find that, despite its effectiveness, it is generally not desirable to replace conventional
interest rate rule with a QE rule. The reason is that such a rule can come with strong side
effects on welfare, which arise from time-variation in the amount of available deposits,
which exacerbate time-varying consumption inequality. The latter can be very costly from
a welfare perspective as some households already consume little even without time-variation
in self-insurance.
Because of the side effects, optimal QE rules avoid large fluctuations in reserves, even if
this means that output and inflation volatility are higher than they could be under aggressive
QE policy. In fact, a simple policy which keeps real reserves, and hence deposits, completely
constant, Real Reserve Targeting (RRT), emerges as approximately welfare optimal in the
model, provided that conventional interest rate policy cannot be used. In future work, it
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would be interesting to study the optimal simultaneous use of QE and interest rate policy.
We conclude with a note on conventional monetary policy. We have assumed that the
central bank directly controls the short-term interest rate, following the NK literature. In
practice, most central banks implement interest rate policy through open market operations.
That is, they lower short-term interest rates by purchasing T-bills (short-term government
debt) and issuing reserves, which in turn triggers deposit creation. To the extent that,
from the private sector’s perspective, deposits are more liquid than T-bills, the stimulating
effects of QE emphasized in this paper may apply to conventional policy as well. We leave
a quantitative exploration of this possibility for future research.
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Appendix
A. Data used in the calibration and estimation
For households’ deposits data, we use “Households and Nonprofit Organizations; Checkable
Deposits and Currency” from the U.S. Flow-of-Funds accounts. For consumption data, we
use “Personal Consumption Expenditures” from U.S. BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis)
minus “Personal Consumption Expenditures: Durable Goods”. For government expendi-
tures data, we use “Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment” from
BEA. Output is defined as the sum of consumption and government expenditures. For in-
flation, we use the growth rate of “Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers”. The
above four series are obtained from 1985Q1 to 2018Q2, and we use the sample averages of
each series to calibrate the model in the steady state.
For the estimation exercise, we only use the sub-sample period 2008Q3-2015Q4 because
the nominal interest rate (i.e., the Fed Funds rate) is at (almost) zero during this period. We
use the deposits-to-output ratio, the government-expenditures-to-output ratio, and inflation.
For the output deviation, we do not use detrended output because the sample is too short.
Instead, we first obtain the real potential GDP estimated by the U.S. Congressional Budget
Office (CBO); the output deviation is then the difference between observed real GDP in
natural log terms and the CBO estimated potential real GDP in natural log terms. To
simplify the estimation exercise, we normalize all variables in 2008Q3 to zero.
For Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF), we use 2016 SCF Chartbook21. Specifically, we
use “Median value of before-tax family income for families with holdings” Table on Page 7
and “Median value of transaction accounts for families with holdings” Table on Page 151.
B. Computation
In the presence of aggregate shocks, the distribution of liquid wealth (deposits) fluctuates
over time, which is relevant to the state of the economy. When solving for equilibrium
dynamics, we therefore need to keep track of this distribution. In the calibrated model, it
turns out that the liquid wealth distribution consists of only mass points. This happens as
households who become unemployed spend all their liquid wealth in the initial quarter of un-
employment, hitting the no-borrowing constraint within the first quarter of unemployment.
Thus, all the unemployed choose Dt(i) = 0.
It follows that any household which transitions from unemployment to employment
holds exactly zero deposits. As a result, all employed households with the same employment
duration behave identically (see also the discussion in Section 4.1). Moreover, all households
which have been unemployed for more than one quarter consume simply their current net
income, whereas the newly unemployed households consume their current income plus their
liquid wealth (which in turn depends on their previous employment duration).
Let us introduce some notation indicating various “cohorts” of employed and unemployed
households. Let a superscript E denote the employed, EU the newly unemployed, and
21https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/BulletinCharts.pdf.
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UU those who have been unemployed for at least one quarter. Further, let k denote the
employment duration of a household up until the current period (i.e. excluding the current
period). For example CEt (k) with k = 0 denotes the consumption level of a currently
employed household which was unemployed in the previous quarter and CEUt (k) with k =
3 denotes a newly unemployed household, who had completed an employment spell of 3
quarters upon job loss.
We can now characterize the household’s choices with the following system of equations.
For employed households we have the following equations:
CEt (k) +D
E
t (k) = wtN
E
t (k) + Θ
E
t +X
E
t − Tt, k = 0, (14)
CEt (k) +D
E
t (k) = wtN
E
t (k) +
Rt−1
Πt
DEt−1(k − 1) + ΘEt +XEt − Tt, ∀k ≥ 1,(15)[
CEt (k)
] −σ = βEt [ Rt
Πt+1
[(
1− pEU) (CEt+1(k + 1))−σ + pEU(CEUt+1(k + 1))−σ]] , ∀k ≥ 0,(16)
wt
[
CEt (k)
] −σ = κ0 [NE(k)] κ1 , ∀k ≥ 0.(17)
For the newly unemployed households (EU) and the remaining unemployed households
(UU) we have:
CEUt (k) +D
EU
t (k) =
Rt−1
Πt
DEt−1(k − 1) + ΘUt +XUt − Tt, ∀k ≥ 1, (18)
DEUt (k) = 0, ∀k ≥ 1, (19)
CUUt +D
UU
t = Θ
U
t +X
U
t − Tt, (20)
DUUt = 0. (21)
The above system contains three blocks of equations. Equations (14), (15), (16), and (17)
are budget constraints. Moreover, (16), (19), and (21) characterize the optimal choices
for deposits (using the fact that the employed are at the no-borrowing constraint, whereas
the employed are on the Euler equation for deposits), and (17) is the first-order optimality
condition for labor supply of the employed households.
In practice, we truncate the above system at a certain employment duration, i.e. we let
k = 0, 1, 2, 3.., K, which renders the state-space finite dimensional. As can be seen from
Figure 2, under our calibration, households converge fairly quickly to a maximum amount
of assets. In our application, we set K = 75 and verify that results are insensitive to the
truncation threshold.22 We close the system by setting for the final cohort of employed
22Setting the threshold as low as K = 20 delivers very similar results.
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households:
CEt (K) +D
E
t (K) = wtN
E
t (K) +
Rt−1
Πt
DEt−1(K) + Θ
E
t +X
E
t − Tt,
(CEt (K))
−σ = βEt
[
Rt
Πt+1
[(
1− pEU) (CEt+1(K))−σ + pEU(CEUt+1(K))−σ]] ,
wt
[
CEt (K)
] −σ = κ0 [NE(K)] κ1 .
These equations impose that beyond an employment duration of k = 75 quarters (i.e., more
than 18 years), all households behave identically. This is not a very restrictive cutoff, since
households already behave practically identically beyond an employment duration of 10 to
20 quarters, see Figure 2. We solve the above system jointly with the remaining model
equations, which are given by:
1− εt + εtwt
At
= φ (Πt − 1) Πt − φEt
[
β
Yt+1
Yt
(Πt+1 − 1) Πt+1
]
,
uXUt + (1− u)XEt = Divt + (1 + ρqt)
Bmt−1
Πt
− qtBmt ,
XUt = X
E
t + µ,
qt = Et
[
β
1 + ρqt+1
Πt+1
]
,
Gt = qtB − (1 + ρqt)B
Πt
+ T cbt + Tt,
T cbt +
Rt−1
Πt
Mt−1 + qtBcbt = Mt + (1 + ρqt)
Bcbt−1
Πt
,
Bcbt +B
m
t = B,
K∑
k=0
ψE(k)DEt (k) = Mt,
K∑
k=0
ψE(k)NEt (k) = Nt,
Yt −Gt + φYt (Πt − 1)2 =
K∑
k=0
ψE(k)CEt (k) +
K∑
k=0
ψEU(k)DEUt (k) + ψ
UUCUUt ,
Yt = ANt,
and in addition the policy equations for either QE or conventional policy and the exogenous
evolution of (εt, At,, Gt, z
QE
t ), as stated in the main text. In the above equations, ψ
E(k),
ψEU(k), and ψUU are population share parameters, which satisfy ψUU = u − pEU(1 − u),
ψE(k) = pUE(1 − pUE)ku for k < K, ψE(K) = 1 −∑K−1k=0 ψE(k) − u, ψEU(k) = pUE(1 −
pUE)kpEUu for k < K, and ψEU(K) = pEUψE(K). For equilibrium dynamics, we use a
first-order perturbation method to solve for the joint system.
Finally, we discuss how to verify easily that in equilibrium the unemployed hit the no-
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borrowing constraint in deposits. This is the case if:
[
CEUt (K)
] −σ > βEt [ Rt
Πt+1
[
pUE(CEt+1(k = 0))
−σ +
(
1− pUE) (CUUt+1)−σ]] .
This equation implies that the newly unemployed with the longest previous employment
spell do not want to save, i.e., they are at the constraint. If this condition holds, then the
same is true for all the other unemployed households, since these are less wealthy, which
implies that CUUt ≤ CEUt (K) and CEUt (k) ≤ CEUt (K). See also Figure 2 for an illustration
of this point. We verify that the above equation holds in the steady state.23
C. Steady state and calibration
This appendix shows how to solve for the steady-state economy in a systematic way, which
is useful for the calibration exercise. The calibration strategy is shown after we discuss
how to solve the steady state efficiently. A more “black-box” alternative is to solve the
entire system of steady-state equations all at once using a numerical solution routine. The
procedure below, however, makes it easier to hit certain calibration targets.
Solving for the steady-state equilibrium
We first show how to solve for the steady-state equilibrium, given all parameters of the
model. To save notation, we let all variables refer to their steady-state levels from now on.
In the steady state, q = 1/(β−1 − ρ) and the wage rate is w = (ε− 1)/ε. The steady-state
inflation is Π = 1. The mutual fund has an exogenous extra amount of liquidation µ for
unemployed agents. The government targets exogenous levels of G, B, M , ΘU , and thus
ΘE (because of the budget-neutral insurance). Next, we solve for the resulting tax policy T
and interest rate policy r, together with dividend payout to employed agents XE.
Suppose we have an initial guess of (T, r,XE). There are K cohorts of employed agents.
The labor supply decision of the kth cohort satisfies
w
CE(k)
= κ0N
E(k),
which means that the labor income is wNE(k) = w
2
CE(i)κ0
. To this end, we first solve the
consumption and saving choice. For the Kth cohort, the Euler equation for deposits is given
by:
1
CE(K)
= βr
[
pEU
1
CUU +DE(K)r
+ (1− pEU) 1
CE(K)
]
,
and the budget constraint is
CE(K) =
w2
CE(K)κ0
+DE(K) (r − 1) + Θ˜E
23Under a local perturbation, the constraint then also holds outside the steady state.
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where Θ˜E = ΘE +XE − T . The above two equations pin down CE(K) and DE(K). There
is even an analytical solution as CE(K) can be solved from a quadratic equation. To see
this, rearrange the Euler equation
1− βr (1− pEU)
CE(K)
=
βrpEU
CUU + rDE(K)
→ DE(K) = βp
EU
1− βr(1− pEU)C
E(K)− C
UU
r
,
which can be used to express the budget constraint as a quadratic equation of CE(K):[
1− (r − 1)βp
EU
1− βr(1− pEU)
] [
CE(K)
]2
+
(
r − 1
r
CUU − Θ˜E
)
CE(K)− w
2
κ0
= 0.
Since
[
1− (r−1)βpEU
1−βr(1−pEU )
]
> 0 and−w2
κ0
< 0, the only positive root is
CE(K) =
Θ˜E − r−1
r
CUU +
√(
Θ˜E − r−1
r
CUU
)2
+ 4
[
1− (r−1)βpEU
1−βr(1−pEU )
]
w2
κ0
2
[
1− (r−1)βpEU
1−βr(1−pEU )
] .
For cohort k = K − 1, K − 2, ..., 1, the Euler equation for deposits is given by
1
CE(k)
= βr
[
pEU
1
CUU +DE(k)r
+ (1− pEU) 1
CE(k + 1)
]
,
and the budget constraint is
CE(k) =
w2
CE(k)κ0
+DE(k − 1)r −DE(k) + Θ˜E.
This means that, given a value DE(K − 1) which is arbitrarily close to but smaller than
DE(K), we can solve backwards for consumption and deposits of the employed households
as:
CE(k) = β−1r−1
[
pEU
1
CUU +DE(k)r
+ (1− pEU) 1
CE(k + 1)
]−1
,
DE(k − 1) = 1
r
[
DE(k) + CE(k)− w
2
CE(k)κ0
− Θ˜e
]
,
for i = K − 1, K − 2, ..., 1.
For the unemployed agents without any savings, the budget constraint implies:
CUU = ΘUU +XU − T
Let us now guess CE(1). For the i = 0th cohort, the Euler equation and the budget
constraint are
CE(0) = β−1r−1
[
pEU
1
CUU +DE(0)r
+ (1− pEU) 1
CE(1)
]−1
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CE(0) =
w2
CE(0)κ0
−DE(0) + Θ˜E.
Since we know CE(1), the two equations solve the two unknowns CE(0) and DE(0).
For any k = 1, 2, ..., K − 1 cohort we then obtain
CE(k) =
w2
CE(k)κ0
+ rDE(k − 1)−DE(k) + Θ˜E,
and also DE(k) = w
2
CE(i)κ0
+ rDE(k − 1) + Θ˜E − CE(k). From the Euler equation
1
CE(k)
= βr
[
pEU
1
CUU +DE(k)r
+ (1− pEU) 1
CE(k + 1)
]
,
we obtain CE(k+ 1) =
[
1
βr(1−pEU )CE(i) − p
EU
(1−pEU )(CUU+DE(i)r)
]−1
. Therefore, given CE(1), we
can calculate De(1), CE(2), DE(2), ...CE(K − 1) and DE(K − 1). We look for CE(1) such
that DE(K − 1) = DE(K)−  where  is an arbitrary small and positive number (i.e., the
amount of savings converge to the fixed point). This is effectively a shooting algorithm.
Aggregate labor supply is then given by
N =
K∑
k=0
ψE(k)NE(k) =
K∑
k=0
ψE(k)
w
κ0CE(k)
. (22)
Now, we turn to the government side. Notice that the debt held by the central bank is
Bcb =
M(1− r)
q − (1 + ρq) ,
and the total debt held by the mutual fund is thus
Bm = B −Bcb.
Finally, after obtaining all equilibrium objects with a given (T, r,XE), we check the
following three equations. Since the total payout is (1 − pU)XE + pUXU = XE + pUµ, we
know that
XE + pUµ = N(1− pU)− wN + (1 + ρq − q)Bm. (23)
The market clearing for reserves is given by:
M =
K∑
k=0
ψE(k)DEt (k). (24)
The goods market clearing is given by:
K∑
k=0
ψE(k)CE(k) +
K∑
k=0
ψEU(k)DEU(k) + ψUUCUU +G = AN. (25)
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These three equations above solve the three unknowns (T, r,XE). That is, if these three
equations do not hold, we change our initial guess of (T, r,XE) and iterate the computation.
Calibration
The above strategy for calculating the steady-state equilibrium objects will be used in the
following calibration exercise.
The average labor supply is targeted (1/3 in our calibration), so N is known. Recall
that the wage rate is w = (ε − 1)/ε, and we thus know the average labor income in the
model. The unemployment benefit is calibrated to be a fraction (0.25 in our calibration)
of average labor income, so ΘU is known. Because of the budget-neutral unemployment
insurance, ΘE is also known. Without loss of generality, we normalize the steady-state
TFP to A = 1, so that Y = N . We target the reserves-to-output ratio M/4Y (or M/Y ),
the government-expenditure-to-output ratio G/Y , the real interest rate r, and the median
deposits-to-income ratio. With these targets, we directly obtain G and M . The following
discussion shows how we calibrate B, κ0, and µ.
First, we have an initial guess of the disutility of labor supply parameter κ0 and the
extra liquidation parameter µ; these will be used when we solve for the households’ decision
rules.
Second, given (κ0, µ), the lump-sum tax T , or equivalently the level of government debt
B, is set such that the model hits the median deposits-to-income ratio. To see this, notice
that the consolidated fiscal and monetary budget constraint implies that
G+ (r − 1)M + (1 + ρq − q)Bm = T. (26)
For any given T , we obtain Bm = [T − (r − 1)M −G] /(1 + ρq − q); using (23) gives XE.
Now, we have (T , r, XE), and we can follow the strategy specified before to calculate steady-
state equilibrium objects. The lump-sum tax T is adjusted so that the model generates the
median deposits-to-income ratio as in the data. In addition, since the level of total debt
satisfies B = Bm + Bcb, we can also view that B is calibrated to hit the median deposits-
to-income ratio, where B is given by
B = Bm +Bcb = Bm +M
(1− r)
q − (1 + ρq) .
Finally, to hit the steady-state labor supply N and the real interest rate r, the guessed
values of κ0 and µ are adjusted such that the labor market clearing condition (22) and the
reserve market clearing condition (24) are satisfied.24 Notice that for a different pair of (κ0,
µ) one needs to re-calibrate B.
24Equation (25) is not used here as we have used the consolidated fiscal and monetary budget constraint in
calibration. The households’ budget constraints and the consolidated government budget constraint imply
the goods market clearing condition (25).
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